Gibbard's theorem

Gibbard's theorem is a key result in game theory showing that there is no universal non-dictatorial mechanism. It states that for any game form (or mechanism) in which players can hold any set of preferences, at least one of the following must hold:

  1. The mechanism is a dictatorship: a single player always dictates the outcome.
  2. The mechanism is a duple: there are only two possible outcomes.
  3. The mechanism is not straightforward: the optimal action for a voter requires strategic behavior, i.e. it depends on their beliefs about other players.

A corollary of this theorem is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The key difference between the two theorems is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite applies only to ranked voting. Because of its broader scope, Gibbard's theorem makes no claim about whether voters need to reverse their ranking of candidates, only that their optimal ballots depend on the other voters' ballots.

Gibbard's theorem is more general, and considers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal: for example, voting systems where voters assign grades to or otherwise rate candidates (cardinal voting). Gibbard's theorem can be proven using Arrow's impossibility theorem.

Gibbard's theorem is itself generalized by Gibbard's 1978 theorem and Hylland's theorem, which extend these results to non-deterministic processes, i.e. where the outcome may not only depend on the agents' actions but may also involve an element of chance.