Bucklin voting

Social choice and electoral systems
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Single-winner methods Single vote – plurality methods First preference plurality (FPP) Two-round (US: Jungle primary) Partisan primary Instant-runoff UK/NZ: Alternative vote (AV) AU: Preferential voting US/CA: Ranked-choice (RCV) Party block voting Plurality block voting Condorcet methods Condorcet-IRV Round-robin voting Minimax Kemeny Schulze Ranked pairs Maximal lottery Positional voting Plurality (el. IRV) Borda count (el. Baldwin, Mdn. Bucklin) Antiplurality (el. Coombs) Rated (cardinal) voting Score voting Approval voting Combined approval voting Majority judgment STAR voting
Proportional representation Party-list Apportionment Highest averages (D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Huntington–Hill) Largest remainders (Hare-Niemeyer, Hagenbach-Bischoff, Imperiali) National remnant Biproportional List type Closed list Localized list Open list Free list No list Quota-remainder methods Single transferable vote (Hare, Droop) Schulze STV CPO-STV Quota Borda Approval-based committees Thiele's method Phragmen's method Expanding approvals rule Method of equal shares Fractional social choice Direct representation Interactive representation Liquid democracy Fractional approval voting Maximal lottery Random ballot Semi-proportional representation Cumulative SNTV Limited voting
Mixed systems By results of combination Mixed-member majoritarian Mixed-member proportional By mechanism of combination Non-compensatory Parallel (superposition) Coexistence Conditional Fusion (majority bonus) Compensatory Seat linkage system UK: 'AMS' NZ: 'MMP' Vote linkage system Negative vote transfer Mixed ballot Supermixed systems Dual-member mixed proportional Rural–urban proportional Majority jackpot By ballot type Single vote Double simultaneous vote Dual-vote
Paradoxes and pathologies Spoiler effects Spoiler effect Cloning paradox Frustrated majorities paradox Center squeeze Pathological response Perverse response Apportionment paradox Best-is-worst paradox No-show paradox Multiple districts paradox Strategic voting Lesser evil voting Exaggeration Truncation Turkey-raising Wasted vote Paradoxes of majority rule Tyranny of the majority Discursive dilemma Conflicting majorities paradox
Social and collective choice Impossibility theorems Arrow's theorem Majority impossibility Moulin's impossibility theorem McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem Gibbard's theorem Positive results Median voter theorem Condorcet's jury theorem May's theorem Condorcet dominance theorems Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem Non-classical mechanisms VCG mechanism Quadratic voting Supermajority Unanimity
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Bucklin voting is an election system that uses ranked (but nontransferable) votes and can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. As in a highest median election system, such as the majority judgment, the Bucklin winner will be one or more candidates with high median ranking or rating. The system is named after its original promoter, Georgist politician James W. Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado. The system is also known as the Grand Junction system. The election system is described in Bucklin's 1911 book The Grand Junction Plan of City Government and Its Results.

It is not used today. It was never widely used but was used in city elections in Cleveland from 1915 to 1921.

It has the weakness that a voter's secondary preference may be used against the voter's first preference. Voters learn not to make secondary preferences. In the 1921 election in Cleveland, 72 percent of the voters marked only their first preference for mayor.