Sicilian Expedition

Sicilian Expedition
Part of the Peloponnesian War

Destruction of the Athenian army at Syracuse, as drawn in 1900
Date415–413 BC
Location
Result Spartan–Syracusan victory
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Strength

Original expedition

  • 5,100 hoplites (heavy infantry)
  • 480 archers
  • 700 slingers
  • 120 other light infantry
  • 30 cavalry
  • 134 triremes

414 BC reinforcements

  • 250 Athenian cavalry
  • 30 mounted archers
  • 400 Sicilian mercenary cavalry

413 BC reinforcements

  • 5,000 hoplites
  • large number of light troops
  • 73 triremes

Initially

  • 5,000–6,000 hoplites
  • 1,200 cavalry
  • At least 100 triremes

Gylippus's relief force

  • 700 armed sailors
  • 1,000 hoplites
  • 1,000 Sicel warriors
  • 100 cavalry

413 BC relief force from Greece

  • 2,000 hoplites

413 BC Sicilian relief force

  • 2,300 soldiers
Casualties and losses
Entire expeditionary force killed, captured or sold into slavery Unknown

The Sicilian Expedition was an Athenian military campaign in Sicily from 415 to 413 BC during the Peloponnesian War. It pitted Athens and its allies against Syracuse, supported by Sparta and Corinth. The expedition ended in a devastating defeat for the Athenians and severely weakened their position in the war.

The expedition was hampered from the outset by uncertainty over its objectives and command structure. Political manoeuvring in Athens expanded an originally modest force of twenty ships into a massive armada, while the expedition's principal advocate, Alcibiades, was recalled to Athens to stand trial before the fleet had even reached Sicily. Despite these setbacks, the Athenians achieved early successes. Syracuse, the most powerful state in Sicily, responded slowly to the threat and was nearly surrounded and besieged before the arrival of reinforcements under the Spartan general Gylippus, who galvanised the city's resistance. Thereafter, the Athenians gradually lost the initiative. Although a large reinforcing armada from Athens briefly restored their advantage, a disastrous assault on a strategic high point and a series of crippling naval defeats undermined both their military effectiveness and morale. A final attempt to evacuate the army failed, and nearly the entire expeditionary force was killed, captured, or sold into slavery.

The consequences of the defeat were immense. Two hundred ships and thousands of soldiers, a significant portion of Athens' military resources, were lost in a single campaign. The disaster encouraged Athens' enemies in mainland Greece and Persia to intensify their efforts against the city, while revolts broke out among Athenian allies in the Aegean. Some historians regard the expedition's failure as the turning point of the war, although Athens continued fighting for another decade. Thucydides observed that contemporaries were astonished not that Athens eventually lost the war, but that it was able to continue fighting for so long after suffering such catastrophic losses. Although Athens rebuilt much of its fleet, the loss of experienced soldiers and sailors proved far more difficult to replace.