30 September Movement

30 September Movement
	Part of the Cold War in Asia, Konfrontasi and the transition to the New Order
	; Pancasila Sakti Monument; ; Victims found in Lubang Buaya. From left to right: General Ahmad Yani, Brigadier General D. I. Pandjaitan, Major General R. Suprapto.; Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo, Major General M. T. Haryono, Major General S. Parman, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean.
Date	1 October 1965
Location	Jakarta and Java, Indonesia
Result	Coup attempt failed; Outbreak of anti-communist purge in Indonesia; Suharto begins to rise to power; PKI and "Communism/Marxism-Leninism" simultaneously banned in a 1966 MPRS session;
Belligerents
30 September Movement Elements of Tjakrabirawa; Communist Party of Indonesia (Disputed) Special Bureau of the Communist Party of Indonesia; ; Angkatan Kelima Militias in Lubang Buaya; Elements of Indonesian Air Force (Suspected, denied by the Air Force); ;	Government of Indonesia Indonesian Army (Loyalist factions); ;
Commanders and leaders
Untung Syamsuri ; Mustafa Soepardjo ; D. N. Aidit ; Kamaruzaman Sjam ; Supono "Pono" Marsudidjojo ; Njono ; Utomo Ramelan	Sukarno Suharto; A. H. Nasution (WIA); Sarwo Edhie Wibowo; Umar Wirahadikusumah
Casualties and losses
	Six Indonesian Army commanders killed during the coup, along with other military and civilian casualties.

The Thirtieth of September Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, also known as G30S, and by the syllabic abbreviation Gestapu for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, Thirtieth of September Movement, also unofficially called Gestok, for Gerakan Satu Oktober, or First of October Movement) was a coup movement allegedly orchestrated by the leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its sympathizers within the Indonesian military.

In the early hours of 1 October 1965 in Jakarta, G30S assassinated six Indonesian Army generals, including the Commander of the Army Ahmad Yani, in an abortive coup d'état. The Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security, General Abdul Haris Nasution, survived the assassination attempt in his house after being urged to escape by his wife, and he jumped into the residence of the Iraqi ambassador next door. But his lieutenant Pierre Tendean was killed while trying to protect the general by claiming he was Nasution. Ade Irma Suryani, Nasution's daughter, was also shot during the chaos and died a few days later.

Later that morning, the organization declared that it was in control of media and communication outlets and claimed to have taken President Sukarno under its protection. During that chaotic morning, Sukarno decided to go to Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport, and eventually rejected giving his support to G30S. Meanwhile Suharto, alongside Nasution and other military officials, managed to suppress G30S in Jakarta. By the end of the day, the coup attempt had failed in the nation's capital. The leader of PKI, D.N. Aidit, who was also at Halim Airport during the coup attempt, decided to escape to Yogyakarta on 2 October 1965.

The bodies of the slain military officers in Jakarta were thrown into a well in Lubang Buaya, near Halim Airport. Suharto was involved in the evacuation process of the bodies on 4 October. The funeral procession for the seven military officers, known as Pahlawan Revolusi (Heroes of the Revolution), was held on 5 October 1965. At that time, Kompas described the funeral as being witnessed by a sea of people in Jakarta. Sukarno was notably absent from the funeral.

In the days and weeks that followed, the army, socio-political, and religious groups blamed the coup attempt on the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Soon a mass purge was underway, resulting in the imprisonment and deaths of many actual or suspected Communist Party members and sympathizers. According to most estimates, at least between 500,000 to 1 million people were killed, with higher estimates reaching 2 to 3 million.

The editorial cartoon from the front page of the PKI newspaper *Harian Rakjat*, 2 October 1965

Investigations and questioning of Suharto's version of the events were long obstructed in Indonesia. While the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initially believed that Sukarno orchestrated the entire coup, several outside sources found inconsistencies and holes in Indonesian army claims, notably Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, who wrote the Cornell Paper that challenged it.