Weaponized interdependence

Weaponized interdependence is a theory in international relations that describes how states can leverage asymmetrical interdependence within global production networks to coerce other actors. The concept was developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in 2019. They argued that states with political authority over the central "hubs" in global economic networks—such as those for finance, data, and trade—can exploit this position to gain a strategic advantage.

This is achieved through two primary mechanisms: the panopticon effect, which involves gathering critical information from data traffic flowing through hubs under control of a powerful state, and the chokepoint effect, which involves a state's ability to limit or deny other actors' access to the network.

The theory challenges earlier liberal views of complex interdependence, which primarily saw it as a source of cooperation and mutual benefit. Instead, weaponized interdependence posits that the very structures created to enhance market efficiency can be repurposed as tools of state power, turning focal points of cooperation into tools of control.