Pankisi Gorge crisis

Pankisi Gorge crisis
Part of war on terror, Spillover of the Second Chechen War, and the Chechen-Russian conflict

The location of the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia
DateNovember 2000 – October 2002
Location
Result Armed Chechen separatists and Arab jihadists largely depart the Pankisi Gorge
Belligerents
Georgia (country) Georgia
Supported by:
United States
Russia
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Chechen militants
Mujahideen in Chechnya
Other jihadists
Commanders and leaders
Georgia (country) Eduard Shevardnadze
Georgia (country) David Tevzadze
Georgia (country) Devi Chankotadze
Georgia (country) Giorgi Shervashidze
Georgia (country) Nikoloz Janjgava
Russia Vladimir Putin
Russia Vladimir Mikhaylov
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Ruslan Gelayev
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Abdul-Malik Mezhidov
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Muslim Atayev
Ibn al-Khattab
Abu Atiya
Strength

Over 1,000 Internal Troops of Georgia

Unknown numbers of Georgian special forces
Hundreds of militants
Casualties and losses
One elderly civilian killed and several injured At least one killed
Dozens captured

The Pankisi Gorge crisis was a geopolitical dispute between Russia and Georgia concerning the presence of armed Chechen separatists and jihadists in Georgia, that peaked in 2002.

At the centre of the crisis was a contingent of Chechen separatist militants who sought shelter from Russian forces in the Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia, 25 miles south of Chechnya in the Russian Federation. Alongside the separatists were jihadists with alleged links to Al-Qaeda and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

From November 2000, Russian officials demanded that Georgia suppress the rebels by force and extradite any captives. They later threatened to invade the Pankisi Gorge to achieve those objectives if Georgia could or would not do so.

Rejecting Russia's demands, Georgian officials said that an armed operation in the Gorge could spark destabilising ethnic conflict, and told the U.S. that they did not have the military capacity to impose order there. Georgia also linked the issue to their own demand that Russia withdraw support from secessionists in the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia.

As part of the nascent war on terror, the United States, like Russia, wanted Georgia to regain control of the Gorge, both to suppress the jihadist threat and to contain the escalation in Georgia-Russian tensions. However, it also wanted to protect Georgia's sovereignty against Russian influence and to integrate Georgia within a U.S.-led international bloc. The U.S. set up a train-and-equip program, which it described as intended to help Georgia's military assert itself in the Gorge, and which also helped prepare Georgian troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the course of the crisis, Georgian special forces acting on U.S. intelligence conducted at least two operations to arrest suspected jihadists.

Pressure on Georgia to act peaked in mid-2002, with a series of Russian airstrikes on Pankisi and several U.S. statements that Georgia must act. The Georgian authorities initiated a major security operation in the Gorge, which was communicated to the militants in advance. The latter began to leave Georgian territory in September 2002. Together with Georgia's extradition of five alleged separatist militants, this caused tensions with Russia to subside to below crisis-level that October.

The Russian claims, sometimes implicating Georgia in supporting the terrorists, was perceived by the Georgian authorities and analysts as an information warfare aimed at expanding Russian influence by internationally discrediting Georgia, using the issue as a lever of pressure, and portraying Georgia as a fundamentally unstable state incapable of full sovereignty and unreliable for Western partners. However, the US support for the Russian claims actually provided raison d'être for facilitating US-Georgian military cooperation, giving Georgia the means to counterbalance Russian pressure but at the same time discontenting Russia which viewed the increasing US presence as undermining its hegemony over its traditional sphere of influence.