Homeostatic property cluster theory

Homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC theory) is an account of natural kinds in the philosophy of science, introduced by Richard Boyd as a non-essentialist alternative to views that define kinds by necessary and sufficient conditions. On this account, many natural kinds are characterised by clusters of properties whose co-occurrence is maintained by causal mechanisms, even though no single property need be shared by every member and the boundaries of the kind may be vague.

Boyd introduced the account in a 1988 essay on moral realism, where the illustrative cases were moral goodness and health, and afterwards developed it chiefly with biological species in mind. It became the most widely discussed alternative to essentialism in debates over natural kinds and was adopted across the philosophy of biology, psychiatry, and the social sciences.

The account has been criticised for the difficulty of individuating the causal mechanisms it requires, for failing to specify what fixes membership in a kind, and for matching poorly the classifications that scientists actually use. P. D. Magnus has argued that being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for being an HPC, and that the account is better understood as describing the ontological basis of some natural kinds rather than defining natural kinds as such. Matthew Slater has proposed a refinement, the stable property cluster (SPC) account, which replaces the mechanism requirement with a more general notion of stability.