Epistemic closure
Epistemic closure is a property of some belief systems and of many epistemic modal logics (viz. those which are "normal"). It is the principle that if a subject knows proposition , and knows that implies , then can thereby come to know . Many epistemological theories involve a closure principle and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle.
On the other hand, some epistemologists, including Robert Nozick, have denied closure principles on the basis of reliabilist accounts of knowledge. Nozick suggested a "truth tracking" theory of knowledge, according to which one knows only if one's belief in is "sensitive" to the truth or falsehood of in the relevant possibilities (modal scenarios). Specifically, sensitivity to a proposition amounts to meeting two counterfactual conditions: (1) if were false, then one would not believe , and (2) if were true, then one would believe . If knowledge must conform to the conditions for sensitivity, then epistemic closure fails because one can know p and that p implies q, whilst not being sensitive to the truth of q (and, therefore, not knowing q).
A subject may not actually believe q, for example, regardless of whether he or she is justified or warranted. Thus, one might instead say that knowledge is closed under known deduction: if, while knowing p, S believes q because S knows that p entails q, then S knows q. An even stronger formulation would be as such: If, while knowing various propositions, S believes p because S knows that these propositions entail p, then S knows p. While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive, philosophers such as Robert Nozick and Fred Dretske have argued against it.